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The Separation of Business and State
Timothy K. Kuhnert

ABSTRACT

National scandals involving corporate fraud, political corruption,
lobbyists, and campaign finance have called attention to worrisome dynamics:
the decreasing power of natural persons relative to legal persons in the political
process; and the erosion of civic or democratic values in favor of corporate
values. Both dynamics relate to the vexing problem of money in politics.
American political thought and constitutional structure offer much-needed
guidance in the form of analogies and separationist logic.
This Essay recasts the phenomenon of money in politics as a separation
problem-that is, a problem of the private sphere of business overreaching into
the public sphere of governance; in short, excessive entanglement. Once the
problem is seen in this light, it is natural to search for insights in the two most
significant separations in U.S. law: the separation of powers and the separation
of church and state. An analysis of these earlier separations reveals that the
forces at work today arise from the same perennial forces contemplated by the
Founders: unreformed human nature, dominated by unenlightened self-interest
and ideological passion, and factions which emerge as a collective
manifestation of interest and passion. Relevant political philosophy from the
first two separations helps define the contours of a third, that between business
and state. Taken as analogies, the earlier separations help explain what is
happening to politics and suggest a solution.
Copyright © 2007 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
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I
THE PROBLEM AT HAND

There are some who see no problem with money in politics and question
the existence of any such thing as the public interest. I do not contend with
them here. There are others and it is for them that I write. They form a large
bipartisan group that focuses on American political ideals and retains a hopeful
and dutiful orientation to democracy. This causes them to be wary of corruption
and intolerant of its apologists. One rightly senses that corruption represents the
exploitation of their creed and the prostitution of their beloved. Their concern
goes beyond abject corruption-such as the bribery of public officials-to
embrace thornier questions involving campaign finance, lobbyists, political
action committees, and corporate political activity in any other form it might
manifest. Although members of this bi-partisan group disagree about the causes
and extent of the problem as well as the content of an ideal solution, they share
the sense that money distorts democracy and that its influence must be
addressed. For them and for all who consider appropriate some limitation on
money in politics, I offer a new way of thinking. It is my sense that we lack a
framework for conceptualizing limits on the ability of financial power to
translate into political power, and that not just any will do. The framework
must be general enough to account for the many dimensions of the issue and
culturally resonant enough to motivate good faith consideration.
The issue of money in politics is truly vexing. Certain dimensions of the
problem suggest that corporations have captured politics, while other
dimensions suggest that wealthy individuals have done so. Money in politics
can be viewed as an assault on political equality-wealthy actors subjugating
common citizens-and yet it can also be viewed as a form of political
expression-free speech. This is enough to cause a rational observer to throw
up her hands. Moreover, the issue has a sort of magnetism that makes it a focal
point for fallacies and stereotypes: the interests of corporations as either equal
to the public good or as inimical to it; capitalism as either freedom or
oppression. This is enough to cause a rational observer to walk away in disgust.
Markets and democracy both arose as means of freedom and equality, and both

1. See generally James M. Buchanan, Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a
Research Program (2003), Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University
(describing the origins and core presuppositions of public choice theory) available at
http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/pdf/ 20links/Booklet.pdf (last visited January 10,
2008). Key questions raised by this program of research include whether it is possible to produce
a rational social ordering through the aggregation of individual preferences and whether any
voting system based on individuals' ranked preferences can satisfy basic requirements of fairness
and stability. On these particular questions, see KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE &
INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1-21, 46-60 (2d ed. 1970).
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can be corrupted. They orient our society and inevitably interact. We must
admit that the question of their interaction boils down to one of degree, but it is
too important to be left to that, which alone degenerates into a most neglectful
relativism. The issue deserves order at the hands of a principled framework. I
propose separationism.
What we are witnessing can be conceptualized as an excessive
entanglement between two systems and their respective spheres: the system of
capitalism and the private economic sphere of business on the one hand, and
the system of democracy or the public sphere of governance and state activities
on the other. This lack of separation is characterized by increases in the
importance of money in elections and related to the role of special interests in
producing legislation, the replacement of sincere debate with a war of sound
2
bites, and widespread ethical impropriety among elected leaders. That these
factors undermine democratic values and procedures, and produce poor public
policies, has been demonstrated many times over. 3 A vital organizing
framework, in contrast, has not been provided. Thinking in terms of a
separation between spheres provides several advantages.
The framework of separationism is faithful to American political
traditions, particularly to the fears and responses of notable founders, and
accurate enough to reveal aspects of the issue thus far opaque. If money in
politics is conceived of as a separation problem, then it belongs within the same
category of concerns that motivated the two other separations in our nation's
legal tradition. Taken as analogies, the separation of powers and the separation
of church and state help us to think deeply about money in politics and,
perhaps, to envision the necessary solution. They suggest that the perennial
forces of self-interest and passion have set themselves upon democracy once
again. The separation of powers responded to the self-interested nature of
humankind, as the Framers saw it. The Framers were not given to expecting
something more balanced than raw power-seeking. And so a structural obstacle
2. Ethical impropriety, including the solicitation of bribes, misuses of earmarks, links to
interested corporations, and ties to lobbyists convicted of corrupting public officials, has become
rather commonplace. See Philip Shenon, Federal Lawmakers From Coast to Coast are Under
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2007, at A16.
See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
3.
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); CHARLES DERBER, CORPORATION NATION: How CORPORATIONS ARE
TAKING OVER OUR LIVES AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (1998);

ROBERT ENGLER, THE

POLITICS OF OIL: A STUDY OF PRIVATE POWER AND DEMOCRATIC DIRECTIONS (1961); CHARLES
E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977)

(discussing the relationship between markets and democracy and expressing concern with
economic power); STAN LUGER, CORPORATE POWER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, AND THE
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 190-91 (2000) (arguing that corporate power should not be understood

only to mean influencing political decisions, but also defining the "context and the problems that
government responds to ...

distribut[ing] tremendous social costs to others"); TED NACE, GANGS

OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY (2003);
RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION
OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA

(1996).
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to usurpation had to be put in place: three separate branches of government
with separate functions and members. The separation of church and state, on
the other hand, arose partly from Jefferson's fear that the church would
interfere with the state. In this way, ideological passion could come to reign
over secular values and edict could trump reasoned debate. To protect the state
and preserve religious freedoms, a constitutional amendment passed and two
separate spheres of authority were demarcated.
In the case of a separation between business and state, the challenge of
accounting for corporate nature in politics has been added to that of accounting
for human nature. Even within the jaundiced view of human beings as rational
utility maximizers, it is clear that utility for most individuals means more than
economic profit. Not so with firms. Self-interested, profit-maximizing entities
commonly seek to control the government because laws affect profits. This is
interest. Passion, on the other hand, is more subtle. While interest manifests
itself through an unrelenting and overt emphasis on profit-margins, passion has
covertly undermined civic values. That is, the norms and values of economic
competition and business culture have spread fast and deep, leading to an
erosion of civic values in the public sphere. A profit-maximization ethos,
antagonistic to social dialogue and good-faith deliberation, now pervades
politics. It is the ideological counterpart to the so-called rational self-interest
that dominates corporate legal structure. In sum, moneyed interests fit the
description of factions given by Madison--"united and actuated by some
other
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
5
community."
the
of
interests
aggregate
and
permanent
the
to
or
citizens,
These earlier separations are also useful teachers in the context of money
in politics because they embody a piece of practical wisdom: namely, our own
American political tradition of using laws to erect structural divides between
institutions of government and the corrosive forces that set themselves upon
politics. Thus, the earlier separations provide an accurate understanding and
point to the necessary solution: that of a third separation, one capable of
accounting for corporate nature. After exploring the first two separations, I
discuss the separation of business and state. 6 I describe the two ways in which
4.
1refer here to the conventional view within neoclassical economics.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
6. The notion of a separation of business and state has been mentioned in various places,
but not developed in any detail. I have uncovered the following related references since the idea
occurred to me in 2002: DERBER, supra note 3, at 196 (1998) ("[N]ew arrangements, new
institutions, and greater deconcentration of corporate power and separationof company and state
are needed.") (emphasis added); John Braithwaite, On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks:
Neglected Dimensions of a Republication Separationof Powers, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 305 (1997).
Although Braithwaite focuses on separations of private power, he does note in passing a key point
that I develop in this Article:
Through influence in a number of states, such private actors sometimes shape global
regulatory regimes in ways that make the citizens of all states subservient to them.

Today, therefore, the separation of business and state has an importance that the
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business has become excessively entangled with the state and make the case for
a formal separation as a matter of law and public values.
In conclusion, I flag certain esoteric implications of separationism.
Because base human tendencies underlie all three separation problems,
personal and collective transformation emerge as imperatives. By protecting
our democracy from corrosive influences, our nation's existing separations
allow democratic governance to function in a more autonomous and
unadulterated form. This begs the question of democracy's promise. Once freed
from the reactive mode of countering threats, what positive functions might
democratic governance serve? I suggest that separations provide the space for
democracy to produce ethical growth and collective transformation. This is
built into the very idea of self-governance in that citizens are forced into nonviolent modes of dialogue, participation, introspection, and accommodation of
differences. If separated from corrosive influences and exercised in good faith,
democratic governance could improve human nature instead of perpetually
falling victim to it.
Thus, the historical focus of this Essay proves, in the end, to be a vehicle
for arriving at a hopeful place. But first, let us contemplate the territory we
know in the present, a landscape characterized by widespread social problems
and the decreasing ability of ordinary citizens to influence their government.
A. Democratic Dilemmas
One wonders why American democracy proves unable to uphold the
public interest. It seems somehow inconsistent, even paradoxical. Why it is that
the people suffer if this is a government of the people, by the people, and for
the people? 7 The reasons will of course depend on what set of policies we
deem to be in the public interest and what sort of suffering we attribute to
public policies as opposed to individual choices. But there are three basic
inconsistencies or paradoxes that relate to democratic premises: why
democracies produce unpopular policies; why the ability of citizens to
participate in politics is unequal; and why political culture does not appear up
to the task of self-governance. I discuss each of these briefly, as it seems a
suitable path for raising the issue of entanglement between the spheres of
business and state.

separation of church and state and separation of powers within the state once had. Even
more neglected in the scholarly literature, however, is the separation of powers within
business.
Briathwaite, supra, at 307-308. A few blogs and internet sources also suggest, without any
elaboration, this notion. See, e.g., Jared Amerson, Separation Between Corporationand State,
http://utah.indymedia.org/
CENTER,
July
21,
2004,
UTAH
INDEPENDENT
MEDIA
news/2004/07/9113.php (last visited January 10, 2008).
7. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (1863), reprinted in RICHARD D. HEFNER, A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 185 (5th ed. 1991).
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1. The ParadoxofPopularSovereignty
A common set of complaints suffices to raise the question of where
decision-making authority lies. Each complaint is not equally traceable to the
problem of money in politics, but each does cause us to question how
seemingly unpopular decisions can come about through representative
governance. Public education is under-funded; 8 the percentage of uninsured9
citizens is increasing with already 46 million living without health insurance;
the minimum wage lingers behind the cost of living; 10 environmental
legislation lingers behind the evidence of global warming; and the government
continues an unpopular foreign occupation projected to cost $1-2 trillion to
fight terrorism, remake the Middle East, and, ironically, spread democracy. 11
Several popular explanations for suboptimal public policies gloss over the
accountability problems produced by monetary influence in politics. One
fashionable explanation posits the irrationality of the voting public, theorizing

8. See Press Release, National Education Association, Congressional Swipes at Public
Education Ignored in State of Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.nea.org/newsreleases/2006/nr060l3l a.html (last visited January 10, 2008 ) ("No Child
Left Behind has been under-funded by $40 billion over the past five years, including $1 billion in
cuts by Congress in December."). House Majority Leader Congressman Steny Hoyer posted the
following statistics on his website: President Bush's 2007 Fiscal Year budget proposal would (1)
under-fund the "No Child Left Behind" initiative by $15.4 billion; (2) call for "the largest cut to
federal education funding in the 26-year history of the Education Department - a $2.1 billion
reduction"; and (3) under-fund special education by 23% (among other budget cuts in education).
See Congressman Steny Hoyer, Will President Bush's Budget Payfor America's Priorities?,at 23, available at http://majorityleader.house.gov/docUploads/SenateBushBudgetEducation.pdf (last
visited January 10, 2008).
9. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 2005 (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthin05/hlth05asc.html (last visited January 10, 2008)
("In 2005, 46.6 million people were without health insurance coverage, up from 45.3 million
people in 2004 .... The percentage of people without health insurance coverage increased from
15.6 percent in 2004 to 15.9 percent in 2005."); see also Todd Zwillich, 46 Million Lack Health
Insurance,
WEBMD,
Aug.
30,
2005,
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/08/30/health/webmd/main806291 .shtml
(last
visited
January 10, 2008). Moreover, the majority of Americans desires guaranteed health care, and yet
the President and Congress are consistently unwilling to provide it. See Robin Toner & Janet
Elder, Most Support U.S. Guaranteeof Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2007, at Al
10.
BUYING

See JARED BERNSTEIN & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
POWER
OF MINIMUM
WAGE
AT 51-YEAR
Low
1 (June 20, 2006),

http://www.epi.org/issuebriefs/224/ib224.pdf (last visited January 10, 2008) ("The minimum wage
now equals only 31% of the average wage for private sector, nonsupervisory workers. This is the
lowest share since at least the end of World War II... . After adjusting for inflation, the value of
the minimum wage is at its lowest level since 1955."); see also Increasing the Minimum Wage:
Initiative

688,

ECON.

OPPORTUNITY

INST.

(1998),

available

at

http://www.eoionline.org/minimum.htm (last visited January 10, 2008) ("[A] full-time worker
earns 30% below the federal poverty threshold for a family of four... Since 1973, the percentage
of workers earning wages that pay below the poverty level has increased from 23 percent to 30
percent--almost a third of the U.S. workforce.").
11.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The True Costs of the Iraq War, PROJECT SYNDICATE (2006),
available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz67 (last visited January 10,
2008).
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that the general public does in fact exert significant control over politics, but
that it makes bad choices due to a series of biases and cognitive errors.' 2 A
second variation of this same theory states that people are guided by emotion
and passion and thus are prone to ignoring their material interests and those of
the nation. 13 Another type of explanation relates to voter cognition, but
revolves principally around political strategy. It describes the success of
conservative groups in trumping economic issues with moral issues, causing
Americans to vote against their own economic self-interest. 14
A third type of explanation capable of encompassing the former two
begins by observing the powerful role played by moneyed interests, especially
corporations, in the political process.' 5 It maintains that public policy does not
serve the public interest because of the influence of money in politics. This
influence is felt in the financing of campaigns, the need to employ the mass
media and spin doctors-both of which are costly-to win elections, and the
superior access to elected officials gained by lobbyists, all of which serve to
disempower the general public. These three explanations are perfectly
complimentary, except insofar as the first two posit that ordinary people have
significant traction in the political process and that, to simplify, there is no
problem with the system, only with people's decisions.
The third explanation, upon which I build, varies from the others by
focusing on the ability of corporations and other moneyed actors to frustrate
popular choice. It questions political representatives' accountability to the
general public. Indeed, it signals a distortion or defect in our system of
representative democracy. Legislative capture results from the increased
traction and incentives afforded concentrated interests, as compared with the
more diffuse interests of the general population. 16 Although public policy often
does not act in accordance with the interests of ordinary people, it does benefit
some people. It would be preposterous to separate this concern over distributive
outcomes from the fact that those who receive the largest piece of the pie
happen to be among the same people and groups who enjoy far greater sway
with elected officials than ordinary citizens. This raises another paradox.

12. See BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007).
13.
See DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE
FATE OF THE NATION (2007).
14. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?: How CONSERVATIVES
WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004); GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW
YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004). For a related analysis written from a Republican
Party perspective, see DAVID HOROWITZ, THE ART OF POLITICAL WAR AND OTHER RADICAL
PURSUITS (2001).
15.
See DERBER, supra note 3.
16.
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (discussing how incentives for collective action apply most
when private goods are generated for group members, as compared to public goods for the general
public, and helping to explain why concentrated interests can defeat diffuse social interests).
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2. The ParadoxofPoliticalEquality
The extent to which monetary power translates into political power serves

as a useful way to measure political inequality. Since money influences
elections and the political process more broadly, economic inequality provides
a foundation for political inequality. If the law allows meaningful differences
between the degree of influence an ordinary American and a wealthy American
or corporation can exert, then the high degree of economic stratification in this

country casts doubt on the integrity of American democracy. The relationship
between economic and political inequality is mutually reinforcing: greater
political traction for the wealthy leads to public policies favorable to the
wealthy, which leads to greater economic inequality, which in turn leads to
greater political inequality, and so on. Tighter regulations on money in politics
could stop this cycle, but those regulations are harder and harder to pass as
wealthy interests become more entrenched in the political process.

Economic inequality has reached such heights that commentators have
declared a new gilded age. 17 Although real wages have stagnated in the last two

decades for a significant majority of Americans, the income of the top .1% of
the population has increased by 600%. 18 In the 1990s, for example, the real

median wages of CEOs increased over 60%, and in 2004 a new record was
reached: "The ratio of CEO compensation to that of the average US worker

[became] the highest in recorded history."' 19 Indeed, in 1998 the top 1%of the
20

population had greater assets than the bottom 90% combined. Meanwhile, the
average worker's pay increases have been offset by inflation and the rising cost
of health care. 21
17. See Louis Uchitelle, The Richest of the Rich, Proud of a New Gilded Age, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2007, at Al ("Only twice before over the last century has 5 percent of the national income
gone to families in the upper one-one-hundredth of a percent of the income distribution.").
18. GLOBAL VALUES io: A SHORT COURSE 55 (Kate Holbrook et. al. eds., 2006).
19. Madeleine Baran, CEO Pay Reaches All-Time High as Workers' Wages Stagnate, THE
at
available
2004,
31,
July
STANDARD,
NEW
http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfinitems/757 (last visited January 10, 2008).
20. Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-1998, Table 2 (Jerome
Levy Econ. Inst. & N.Y. Univ., Working Paper No. 300, 2000). See also Bradford Plumer,
30,
2007,
available at
REPUBLIC,
Jan.
NEW
Purchasing Power, THE
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w070l29&s=plumer013007 (last visited January 10, 2008)
("By the late '90s, the richest 1 percent of American households held one-third of all wealth in the
U.S. economy, and took in 14 percent of the national income - a greater share than at just about
any point since the Great Depression.").
21.
See Baran, supra note 19 ("[T]he average worker will receive a 3.3 to 3.5 percent pay
increase this year ... Pay increases for most workers are at the slowest rate since at least the mid1970s. Inflation and mounting health care costs are expected to off-set these already small
raises."). Incidentally, early U.S. policies in Iraq will likely produce similar effects. For example,
one of Paul Bremer's first actions as the interim administrator of Iraq was to change Iraq's
corporate laws so that all domestic industries and resources could be entirely foreign-owned;
100% of profits earned could be taken out of Iraq; and foreign companies would receive either a
15% fiat tax or no tax at all, if operating pursuant to a reconstruction contract. See Dana Milbank
& Walter Pincus, U.S. Administrator Imposes Flat Tax System on Iraq, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
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If democracy concerns those "processes by which ordinary citizens exert a
relatively high degree of control over [political] leaders," 22 it follows that
certain conditions must be in place to restrain citizens who are exceptional, for
example, in terms of monetary power or brute strength, from dominating
ordinary citizens. And yet the Supreme Court has ruled that corporate monetary
contributions constitute free speech protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution. For example, in striking down a state statute criminalizing some
corporate expenditures designed to influence the vote on referendum proposals,
the Supreme Court noted that corporate use of financial power is a "type of
speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true
because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual." 23 This
statement is notable in light of vast disparity of wealth between legal persons
and natural persons, and in light of the 24
amount of money required to mount a
level.
federal
the
at
campaign
successful
Of the top 100 richest entities in the world, as measured by the Gross
Domestic Product or sales, 52 are corporations and 48 are countries." Under
current Supreme Court case law, corporations are considered legal persons and
have constitutional rights. 26 Relying on their status as legal persons, which
allows them equal protection and free speech under the Constitution,
corporations contributed nearly $2 billion to political causes in 1996.27 The
28
Bush and Gore campaigns combined spent $325 million on the 2000 election.
In 2004, the average House winner raised over $1 million and the average
Senate winner more than $6 million. 29 Approximately $2 billion were spent on
2003, at A9; see also L. PAUL BREMER, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDERS No. 39

"Foreign Investment" (Dec. 20, 2003), No. 37 "Tax Strategy for 2003" (Sept. 19, 2003), No. 38
"Reconstruction Levy" (Apr. 4, 2004), and No. 49 "Tax Strategy for 2004" (Feb. 2, 2004),
available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/index.html#Orders

(last visited January

10,

2008).
22. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 2 (1956) (seeking to
uncontroversially describe the thing that concerns democratic theory).
23. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
24. Legal persons are of course controlled by natural persons, but CEOs and board
members are hardly representative of "ordinary people"; moreover, their organizational structure
roots out conscience and makes moral behavior rather out of place. See generally JOEL BAKAN,
THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 60-110 (2004)
(describing the profit-maximizing, externality producing, liability avoiding, and democracy coopting nature of the large corporation).
25.

INST. FOR POL'Y STUD., CORPORATE VS COUNTRY ECONOMIC CLOUT: THE Top

oo

(2003), http://www.ips-dc.org/global-econltop_100.pdf (last visited January 10, 2008).
26. See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394118 U.S. 394 (1886); JAMES
D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 2-6 (2d ed. 2002) (describing corporate personhood and the

constitutional rights of corporations).
27.
DERBER, supra note 3, at 33.
28.
See CHARLES LEWIS, THE BUYING OF THE PRESIDENT, 2004: WHO'S REALLY
BANKROLLING BUSH AND HIS DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGERS 4 (2004).
29.
See THE CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., HOUSE AND SENATE WINNER'S RECEIPTS, 2001-2004,
http://www.efinst.org/pr/pdf/Congr/ElectionResultsTablel.pdf (noting the mean quantity raised

as $1,024,918 for the House and $6,580,722 for the Senate) (last visited January 10, 2008).
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TV ads this past political campaign season and in the last sixty days before the
election, 90% of these ads were negative. 30 Fifty percent of the thirty-six
senators who left office between 1998 and 2005 have become lobbyists, 31 and
the number of lobbyists has more than doubled since the year 2000.32
This picture bodes poorly for political equality. The power of
concentrated interests coupled with permissive laws and the monetary demand
of political campaigns makes governmental capture something of an
inevitability. 33 Private interests-wealthy, well organized, and afforded traction
by the political system--easily overwhelm the general public in terms of access
and influence. We need not look further than Congress itself for confirmation.
After interviewing sixteen Congress members, more than half of whom were
Republican, Larry Makinson reported that "[v]irtually everyone accepted the
long-held Washington premise that money buys access to members." 34 Ronald
Dworkin argues that "[l]arge campaign contributors purchase what is
euphemistically called 'access' to officials; in fact they often purchase not
merely access but control., 35 As such, wealth is a form of political capital, and,
given the broad disparities in wealth within the United States, the amount of
attention and concern that U.S. citizens will receive from their elected
representatives will vary accordingly. We need not even speak of the prospect
of equality in ability to access and influence elected representatives.
One reason for this inequality lies in the harsh realities of political
campaign finance. As noted above, it takes millions of dollars to win a
congressional or presidential election, and therefore securing large campaign
donations, as large as permissible under law, becomes paramount. This is
significant on several fronts. First, it means that, as a general rule, the average
citizen cannot run for Congress or the Presidency. As Representative Tim
Roemer observed, "the amount of time it takes to raise the money. . . [and]
some people's inherent access to the political system [because] they come from
money . . . certainly precludes poor and low income people from ever
36
running."
30. Susan Page, Nasty Ads Close Out a Mud-caked Campaign, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 2006,
at All.
31. Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, Hill a Steppingstone to K Streetfor Some, WASH. POST, July 27,
2005, at A19 [hereinafter Birnbaum, Hill a Steppingstone] ("Two thirds of the Republican
senators who went into private life since 1998-12 of 18-have become lobbyists, compared with
one-third of Democratic senators-6 of 18-who have done the same. In the House, nearly half
of the Republicans eligible to become lobbyists have registered to do so over that period-46 of
94. House Democrats became lobbyists at a lower rate-32 percent, or 22 of 68 retirees.").
32. Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, The Road to Riches Is Called K Street, WASH. POST, June 22,
2005 at Al [hereinafter Birnbaum, The Road to Riches].
33. C.f OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 16.
34. LARRY MAKINSON, SPEAKING FREELY: WASHINGTON INSIDERS TALK ABOUT MONEY
IN POLITICS 59 (2003).
35.

RONALD

DWORKIN,

IS DEMOCRACY

POSSIBLE

HERE?:

PRINCIPLES

FOR A NEW

POLITICAL DEBATE 129 (2006).

36.

MAKINSON, supra note 34, at 74. The problems of such inequality are of the
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Second, the realities of political finance signify that moneyed interests
will be overrepresented in determining the outcome of political campaigns and
legislative priorities. Representative Robert Borski has noted that "you can't
raise $1,000 from people who make $45,000 or $50,000 a year." 37 Indeed,
most of those with the wherewithal to contribute the necessary funds enjoy
household incomes of over $100,000. 38 Essentially, wealthier people are the
ones who are positioned to contribute substantially to political campaigns,
constituting a basic plutocracy.
Gore Vidal has confirmed Representative Borksi's point and expanded it
to include corporations, which form part of the plutocracy:
Of the billions now spent each election cycle, most is donated in
checks exceeding $1,000. But less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the
general population make individual contributions at this rate. And
among group contributors, better than 90 percent comes from
corporations, which duly record their
political investment as a tax39
deductible "cost of doing business."
Moneyed interests make campaign contributions with expectations of
returns on their investments, a supposition evidenced by corporations giving
heavily to both political parties. 40 It follows that those who do not fund
campaigns will receive only limited attention. Political inequality and corporate
political activity warrant reflection on the nature of our political community.
Corporate legal personhood brings new meaning to the notion of a
government of the people, by the people, and for the people. 41 In light of these
legal persons' immense resources and superior attributes-such as perpetual
life, simultaneous existence in multiple places, and limited liability in addition
to civil rights 42-the nature of the political community and its outputs change
substantially. The eras of slavery, segregation, and the exclusion of women
from the vote illustrate the most obvious forms of a democratic deficit. Today
there is a more subtle, but nonetheless important, distance between the theory
and the practice of democracy. Formally speaking, we are all included in
elections, but absent public financing of elections, wealthy interests receive

foundational sort. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 25

(2d ed. 1998) ("[T]he major concern of ancient theorists of constitutionalism was to attain a
balance between the various classes of society and so to emphasize that the different interests in
the community, reflected in the organs of the government, should each have a part to play in the
exercise of the deliberative, magisterial, and judicial functions alike.").
37.
MAKINSON, supra note 34, at 37.
38. Plumer, supra note 20 ("[I]n the 2000 election, 95 percent of those donors making
substantial campaign contributions came from households earning over $100,000.").
39.

Gore Vidal, Foreword in DAVID DONNELLY ET AL., MONEY AND POLITICS: FINANCING

ix-x (1999).
40. LEWIS, supra note 28, at 119-28. The large contributions of labor unions to the
Democratic Party should be recognized as one major difference between the two. See id.
41.
See Cox, supra note 26.
42. See id. at 3-6.
OUR ELECTIONS DEMOCRATICALLY, at
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greater attention. Furthermore, as Ralph Nader and Noam Chomsky have
powerfully pointed out, 43 our two-party system affords only a small range of
choices, and the news media often function to manufacture consent on any
given issue. Both political parties receive heavy corporate funding, the media
are largely owned by corporations, and the general public, lacking the resources
to compete with entire industries, does not set the agenda. 4
3. The ParadoxofDemocratic Culture
Beyond the paradoxes associated with control of government, there lies
yet another which concerns the spirit of politics. If democracy rests on the
premise of popular engagement and reasoned dialogue between opposing
camps, how is it that we have arrived at a place of widespread cynicism, utter
partisanship, and ideological determinism? Even four members of the Supreme
Court have observed a "cynical electorate." 45 This is in line with a total voter
turnout rate of 41.3% in 2006 and 60.93% in 2004, averaging out to half of the
eligible voting population. 46 Tied to cynicism and modest turnout, many have
observed the poor quality of political debate in the United States. Ronald
Dworkin laments the "lack of any decent argument in American political
life,"47 and writes that "each side has no respect for the other. We are no longer
partners in self-government; our politics are rather a form of war." 48 Al Gore
noted the same phenomenon: "American democracy is now in danger-not
from any one set of ideas, but from unprecedented changes in the environment
within which ideas either live and spread, or wither and die. I do not mean the
physical environment; I mean what is called the public sphere, or the
49
marketplace of ideas."
The paradoxes discussed above-those of sovereignty, equality, and
culture--draw our attention to the matter of democratic integrity and the
challenge of generating a suitable framework of analysis.

43.
See EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (1988); RALPH NADER, THE GOOD FIGHT: DECLARE

YOUR INDEPENDENCE AND CLOSE THE DEMOCRACY GAP 23-33 (2004).
44.

See DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM HOYNES, THE BUSINESS OF MEDIA: CORPORATE

MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2d ed. 2006) (discussing deregulation, ownership
concentration, mergers and acquisitions, advertising revenue, and media models among other
issues).
45. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007) (Souter,
J., joined by Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "the demand for
campaign money in huge amounts from large contributors... has produced a cynical electorate").
46. See
U.S.
Election
Project,
Voter
Turnout
Statistics,
http://elections.gmu.edu/votertumout.htm (last visited January 10, 2008).
47. DWORKIN, supranote 35, at 4. Dworkin further observes that "our national politics fails
the standards of even a decent junior high school debate." Id. at 127.
48. Id. at 1.
49.

AL GORE, THE ASSAULT ON REASON 2-3 (2007).
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B. A Path to Resolution.
In considering how to address the issue of monetary influence in politics,
we can be guided by the sense that problems cannot be solved at the same level
of consciousness at which they were created.50 Corporations infringe on
politics because they see no separation between the private sphere and public
sphere. Profit-maximizing entities see politics as a competition of interests, a
game to be played as fiercely as possible. Therefore, corporations will fight,
undermine, or even violate barriers to monetary influence over politics. These
entities come from the world of business and are guided, even in their
relationship to government, 51 by the norms and values of the business world.
For those who operate on this level, the temptation to control government
becomes irresistible. Rates of taxation, corporate bailouts, health care policy,
and foreign policy devoted to liberalizing other countries, all profoundly affect
corporate profits. 52 Philip Morris, for example, spent more on the 1996
elections than any other special interest organization, a fact explained by its
director of communications in the following terms: "Philip Morris supports
those who share our thoughts. We have a responsibility to our employees and
shareholders to be in the political process and we are happy to do so." 53 Indeed,
Milton Friedman, Nobel Prize-winning economist and the great champion of
economic liberalism, has described profit-maximization as the "one and only
one social responsibility of business." 54 Since the purpose of the corporation is
to create wealth for shareholders, and government policies affect profit, it
follows that corporations will seek to influence the government to the greatest
extent possible.
Consequently, the private sphere of the economy-businesses,
corporations, and money-has become excessively entangled with the public
sphere of governance and democracy. We are therefore confronted with a
separation problem. We ought to consider whether a stronger wall of separation
should be erected between our two engines of freedom: capitalism and
democracy, business and state. 55 If we answer in the affirmative, then we must
50.

Philip D. Gould & Patricia H. Murrell, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Cognitive

Complexity: An Overview, 29

FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 2117, 2131 (2002).

51. Corporate influence over the medical profession, for example, provides a case study
outside of the realm of governance. See, e.g., Op-Ed., Is Your Doctor Tied to Drug Makers?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2007, at A20.
52. See DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 91 (discussing the distributive impact of the Bush
administration's tax policies).
53.

See DERBER, supra note 3, at 165.

54. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine).
55.
Even the economically liberal perspective of Milton Friedman acknowledges the need
for separation: "The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly,
namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic
power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other." MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9 (1962). The particular circumstances to which Friedman
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inquire into the dimensions of the separation problem and the appropriate
character of a solution. Guidance on both of these matters can be found in the
political thought and legal doctrines surrounding the two separations already
established under U.S. law.
II
HISTORICAL ANALOGIES

A. HistoricalPerspectives on Corporations
Before looking for guidance in historical analogies, let us take stock of
what certain key historical figures have said about corporations directly. Early
in the history of our nation, Thomas Jefferson noted the conflict between
economic power and representative democracy, and expressed a most
controversial aspiration: "I hope we shall take warning from the example and
crush in its birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already
to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws
of our country." 56 Fifteen years later, in 1831, a young French lawyer named
Alexis de Tocqueville arrived in the United States. Lost amidst his classic study
of American democracy, lies a prescient warning. Referencing the
"manufacturing aristocracy," Tocqueville said this: "[T]he friends of
democracy should keep their eyes anxiously fixed in this direction; for if ever a
permanent inequality of conditions and aristocracy again penetrates into the
57
world, it may be predicted that this is the gate by which they will enter."
Forty years later, the Civil War nearing its end, Abraham Lincoln confessed a
staggering fear that corroborated Tocqueville's prediction:
As a result of the war, corporations have been enthroned and an era
of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the
country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the
prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands
and the Republic is destroyed. I feel at this moment more anxious for
the safety of my country than ever before, even in the midst of war. 58
Those of us concerned with the problem of corporations in politics can
rest assured, we are in good company.
Grave admonitions by famed statesmen continued in more recent eras.
responds in this quote had everything to do with government interference in economic activity, yet
the underlying concern below the superficial question of whether the government is interfering in
the economy or vice-versa is simply whether the two institutions are maintained relatively
separate.
56. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Tom Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), reprinted in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 69 (Paul L. Ford ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1892-1899).
57.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 161 (Knopf Everyman's Library
Series No. 179, 1994).
58. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William F. Elkins (Nov. 21, 1864), in 2 EMANUEL
HERTZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A NEW PORTRAIT 954 (1931).
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Forty years after Lincoln's remarks, at the start of the new century, President
Theodore Roosevelt pleaded before Congress: "[a]ll contributions by
corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose should be
forbidden by law." 59 Discussing the type of political corruption associated with
corporate financial influence over national elections, Roosevelt said there was
60
"no enemy of free government more dangerous and none so insidious."
President Eisenhower's famous 1961 farewell address struck a similar tone: "In
the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought . . . The potential for the
disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. ' 6 1 Although his
remarks centered on the "military-industrial complex" and did not touch on
corporate political influence more broadly, the dangers of the former are but
one troubling result of the latter. Eisenhower urged the nation to respond to
unwarranted corporate influence over politics. "It is the task of statesmanship,"
he said, "to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and
system--ever aiming toward the
old, within the principles of our democratic
62
supreme goals of our free society."
That these men had occasion to make such remarks from early in the life
of the nation and up through recent times testifies to the absence of explicit
constitutional provisions for controlling corporations. 63 Although concerned by
the possibility of corporate power and interested in a role for corporations in
the development of the nation, Madison failed to persuade other delegates to
the Constitutional Convention to grant the federal government control over
corporate charters. 64 Still, Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton had been busy
anticipating the forces that could sink the republic, and they largely succeeded
in countering them through constitutional structure. The first force was human
nature, specifically self-interested power-seeking, which Madison advocated
restraining by creating three separate branches of government, each with its

59. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2690 (2007)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting President Theodore Roosevelt). Justice Souter's opinion usefully
summarizes the history of campaign finance reform and notes how Roosevelt's remarks led to the
Tillman Act of 1907.
60. Id. at 2689 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting President Theodore Roosevelt).
61.
Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Military-IndustrialComplex Speech, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1961, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/speeches/eisenhower001.htm
(last visited January 10, 2008).
62. Id.
63. At the Constitutional Convention, however, Madison proposed repeatedly that the
federal government be placed in charge of corporations. This proposal was defeated largely
through reference to the situation of the oppressive East India Company, which acted as a proxy
for foreign governments. The strength of the federal government could be unduly increased and
made more dangerous through control of corporations. And so the power to grant corporate
charters came to reside in the several states. See Nace, supra note 3, at 47-48 (discussing
Madison's proposal as well as a more limited proposal by Benjamin Franklin, both of which were
rejected at the Constitutional Convention).
64. Id.
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own areas of competence. The second force was the church, an ideologicallyJefferson felt should be
driven and potentially oppressive force, which
65
distanced from the state by a "wall of separation."
Although the Framers failed to account for corporations, their efforts to
separate corrosive forces from the state provide a pathway for those of us to
whom responsibility for the third separation falls. In addition to providing a
pathway for action, earlier separations provide a pathway for understanding,
drawing our attention to the forces of interest and passion. This is the guidance
they left us.
B. The Separation of Powers.
sufficient, condition of liberty:
"Separation is a necessary, if
66 not
its absence promotes tyranny."
1. History and Theory
The American Revolution vindicated the values of popular sovereignty
and political equality. 67 Significant consequences flowed from the premises
that government derives its power from the consent of the governed, and that
all people are created equal and have unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. If power was to be vested in the people, for example,
then the demons of human nature had to be accounted for in governmental
structure. Otherwise, the government would be compromised by the failings of
the populace. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay argued in The
FederalistPapers that human nature and the problem of factions demanded a
separation of powers to prevent any person or group from dominating
69
government.
The flaws of human nature that necessitated a separation of powers were
largely the same ones that required the establishment of a federal government.
In describing the reasons why the states-if they remained separate or in a
mere partial confederacy-would likely wage war against each other, Hamilton
noted that to imagine any other outcome "would be to forget that men are

65. Although the phrase, "separation of church and state" is attributed to Jefferson (see his
1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists Association), it was Roger Williams who first referred to a
"wall of separation" in this context. See ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON'S LETTER LATELY
AND ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in 1 ROGER WILLIAMS, THE COMPLETE
WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 108 (Russell & Russell 1963).
66. GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 9 (1997).
PRINTED, EXAMINED

67. See USHistory.org, The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, available at
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/index.htm (last visited July 8, 2007).
68. See id. ("We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. - That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.").
69. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS.

BUSINESS AND STATE

20071

2369

ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.",70 He continued on to describe the
particular forms taken by such rapaciousness: "[T]he love of power or the
desire of pre-eminence and dominion - the jealousy of power or the desire of
equality and safety., 7 1 The private passions of "leading individuals in the
communities" could also interfere.72 Hamilton considered that "[m]en of this
class.., have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed; and
assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the
national tranquility to personal advantage or personal gratification." 73 If united
under a single government, the theory went, individual states run by selfinterested rulers would not destroy each other.
It did not follow, however, that the mere fact of a federal government
would adequately control these facets of human nature. Although a union
would prevent wars between the states, it would not prevent the emergence of
factions, which Madison defined as "a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of the citizens,
or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."' 74 Thus, the
federal government proposed a crucial structural device for preventing the
concentration of power within any given group, a "foundation
for that separate
75
and distinct exercise of the different powers of government."
The first three articles of the Constitution describe the different functions
of the three branches of government, thus providing for a separation of powers.
Beyond specifying the powers of the federal government, the first three articles
of the Constitution specify which branch may exercise which powers. Powers
committed to one branch cannot be exercised by another branch; accordingly,
three distinct spheres emerge. The separation of powers is not just about
branches of government. It also entails a "separation of persons ' '76 where "no
individual being allowed to be at the same time a member of more than one
branch. 77 Indeed, what sense would it make if, although the branches
themselves remained separate, one group of people was permitted to control
them all? In this way, the separation of powers could become a dead letter. In
the end, the Framers agreed upon three separate articles, three separate
branches, and a resulting system of checks, balances, and structural controls to
secure liberty from the grasp of human nature.Arguing for a separation of
powers, Madison said:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the
70.

THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 54.

71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.

74.
75.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 78.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 321.

76.
77.

VILE, supra note 36, at 18.
Id. at 14.
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man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It
may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
78
If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
Taking this view seriously might lead one to question whether selfgovernment, indeed whether democracy itself, is a sound proposition. But
Madison also saw the positive potential in human nature; beyond a "degree of
depravity," he noted "there are other qualities in human nature which justify a
certain portion of esteem and confidence." 79 He went on to suggest that the
''political jealousy of some among us" is not representative of the human
character. And thankfully so, for if it were, "the inference would be, that
there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing
less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and
' 81
devouring one another."
Thus, the very possibility of good governance in a democracy emanates
from human potential. And although Madison was wise to pit ambition against
ambition, we might go further and ask whether ambition need be the end point
of human progress. Indeed, ambition in the service of greed describes our
present dilemma. Might it not be possible, though, to rise above this and either
cease to be ambitious or to put ambition in the service of something greater
than greed? Our political tradition suggests a depth of aspiration consistent with
such a project, but the first order of business has been to restrain vices, not to
generate virtues.
The Framers understood the vices of human nature, especially narrow
self-interest, to warrant a separation in law to preserve democracy. It turns out,
however, that the forces of self-interest and passion are not so easily restrained.
And so we come to a familiar bromide: the realization of democratic potential
requires democratic vigilance. In this case, the vigilance is owed towards the
new forms in which self-interest and passion might manifest in order to achieve
their ends. Madison was familiar with human nature and with factions
composed of individuals-whether a majority or a minority, individuals
nonetheless. Today, we are faced with corporate nature and factions composed
of multinational corporations.
2. Lessonsfor the Separationof Business and State
Madison identified human nature as a key rationale for the separation of
powers and unequal property distribution as a key cause of factions.8 2 Today,
78.
79.

THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5,at 322.
THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 346.

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. Iraq may provide a modem example where this inference would apply.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 79 ("[T]he most
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corporate nature generates a greater challenge, even aside from the rising
inequality associated with corporate flourishing. 83 Corporations are driven by
profit-maximization, a common impulse that, when pursued single mindedly,
proves adverse to the rights of the citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community. Milton Friedman stated that increasing its profits is
"the one and only social responsibility of business." 84 This exclusive focus on
profit-maximization is also reflected in corporate law where the CEO is
obligated to maximize financial returns for shareholders. 85 The single-minded
goal of profit-maximization leads corporations to attempt to influence the state,
for it is law that determines rates of taxation, minimum labor standards,
environmental ordinances, liberalization of foreign economies necessary for the
expansion of markets, the existence of civil remedies for defective products,
environmental harm, workplace abuse, and many other matters upon which
profits depend. And like all exercises of power for self-interested purposes, the
motivation behind corporate driven reform will not be honestly and openly
displayed for all to see. Corporations, with the help of experts in psychology,
advertising and marketing, focus groups, and visual media productions, have
done their best 86to frustrate public awareness, even to suppress independent,
critical thought.
As might now be clear from the philosophy behind the separation of
powers, corporate nature should be understood as a new manifestation of
human nature, albeit in a more sophisticated form. Unlike natural persons,
corporations have limited legal liability, perpetual existence, the power of
common and most durable source of faction, has been the various and unequal distribution of
property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests
in society.")
83. See notes 17-20, supra (discussing rising inequality).
84. Friedman, supra note 54. This belief has been defied, or at least reformed slightly, by
some corporations. The voluntary reforms of the corporate social responsibility movement
constitute a positive development. They are, however, dependent on the profitability of good
behavior. See generally WILLIAM C. FREDERICK, CORPORATION BE GOOD! THE STORY OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2006); and DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE

POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2006) (documenting and
praising various aspects of the voluntary movement for corporate reform, but noting the limits on
its potential imposed by shareholders, corporate legal structure, and market conditions).
85. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of
the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the
choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the
reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them
to other purposes."); MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE
CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY 19-28 (2001) (discussing business models and the obligations owed to

shareholders in corporate law); Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section
2.01 of the ALl's Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 512-513 (1984) (discussing the primary
importance of economic objectives in the corporate legal form).
86. See EDWARD L. BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA 71-128 (1928); STUART EWEN, PR!: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN 215-414 (1996); JOHN STAUBER & SHELDON RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE
IS GOOD FOR You! LIES, DAMN LIES AND THE PUBLIC RELATIONS INDUSTRY 13-24 (1995).
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virtual location, and the power to shape-shift, or reorganize themselves. 87 It is
partly because of these attributes that the need for outside restraint on corporate
nature is greater than the same need with regard to human nature. And yet the
need is also greater for a less obvious reason.
Our nation's political structure is built on the assumption that members of
the political community care about more than one thing. Rousseau expressed
this as the twin capacities of self love and pity, 88 not to mention eventual
surrender to the general will pursuant to the social contract. 89 Rousseau wrote
that "there is another principle... which, having been given to man in order to
mitigate, in certain circumstances, the ferocity of his egocentrism or the desire
for self-preservation before this egocentrism of his came into being, tempers
the ardor he has for his own well-being by an innate repugnance to seeing
fellow man suffer. . .. I am referring to pity." 90 Madison's theory that factions

could be set against each other and that an expansive democracy could temper
local prejudices was functionally similar. It posited the moderation of pure self
interest by necessity. To get anything done in a large, representative system,
competing9 1 groups would have to form alliances and generate consensus
positions.
Unlike human nature, corporate nature is not tempered by pity or interfactional accommodation. Joel Bakan elaborates:
[T]he corporation can neither recognize nor act upon moral reasons to
refrain from harming others. Nothing in its legal makeup limits what it
can do to others in pursuit of its selfish ends, and it is compelled to
cause harm when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Only
pragmatic concern for its own interests and the laws of the land
constrain the corporation's predatory instincts, and often that is not
enough to stop it from destroying92lives, damaging communities, and
endangering the planet as a whole.
Although we must applaud the corporate social responsibility
movement, 93 which seeks to reform corporate nature from the inside, we
cannot wager the integrity of democracy on voluntary corporate reform. This
would be akin to Madison passing out Bibles to all citizens, imploring them to
87.
88.

See NACE, supra note 3 (discussing the powers granted to corporations by law).
See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of lnequality, in JEAN-JACQUES

ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT; DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY; DISCOURSE

ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 105, 116 (Donald A. Cress trans. & ed., Hackett Publishing 1983)
(1754).
89. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 69 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Classics 1968) (1762).
90. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of lnequality, supra note 88, at 133.
91.
See James Madison, Speech in the Federal Convention on Factions(June 6, 1787), in
JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 92, 92-93 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). See generally The Federalist
No. 10 (James Madison) (contending with the threat posed by factions).
92. BAKAN, supra note 24, at 60.
93.
See FREDERICK, supra note 84.
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behave morally, instead of separating the powers of government.
C. The Separationof Church and State
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their Legislature should 'make no law

respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and
State.94
-Thomas

Jefferson

1. History and Theory
The separation of church and state was intended to safeguard the state
from religion, and religion and religious freedom from the state. 95 The first of
96
these two purposes provides a useful analogy for the problem of plutocracy.
Jefferson believed that "the church should be walled off from the state in order
to safeguard secular interests (public and private) 'against ecclesiastical
depredations and incursions.' 97 Separation was necessary, in part, to prevent
religion from corrupting and undermining government.
This much is reflected in the Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Everson v.
Board of Education.98 In addition to quoting Jefferson's "wall of separation"
metaphor as the intention behind the First Amendment, the Court noted the
impermissibility of religious groups driving government affairs: "Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
94. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 5
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 96 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
95.

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-59 (2d ed. 1988)

(describing the various "schools of thought" behind the First Amendment). Drawing on the
purpose of safeguarding religion from the state, one could attempt an essay on how the religious
clauses reveal the evils of state interference in the economy. This would focus on "the evangelical
view (associated primarily with Roger Williams) that 'worldly corruptions ... might consume the
churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not maintained."' Id. at 1158.
96. Kevin Phillips has usefully described plutocracy as "the fusion of money and
government," PBS, Transcript:Bill Moyers Interviews Kevin Phillips, Apr. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript-phillips.html, and defined the term as government
by or in the interest of the rich, KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERIL AND
POLITICS OF RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, at xi
(2006).
97. TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1158-59. Supporting this view of Jefferson's reasons for
separationism, Tribe notes Jefferson's interest in barring clergy from public office and his
"conviction that only the complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal
influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views." Id. at
1159. But see DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION

BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 60 (2002) (arguing that Jefferson's metaphor "was not offered as
a general pronouncement on the prudential relationship between religion and all civil government;
rather, it was, more specifically, a statement delineating the legitimate constitutional jurisdictions
of the federal and state governments on matters pertaining to religion").
98.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa." 99 The words
"vice versa" direct our attention to something often taken for granted. It is clear
to all but the most radical of the religious right that the state is not supposed to
be coordinated with or subordinated to the Church, merely the "secular ann of
[a] Deity maintaining outward order and decorum among men."' 0 0 Indeed, the
Constitution provides no mechanism for religious authority to assert control
over the government. In fact, the Constitution prevents it.
This task of ascertaining the state's nature turns out to be a lot cleaner in
theory than in practice, especially now with the political ascendancy of a
radical religious minority. Consider the following contemporary facts about the
United States noted by Kevin Phillips in his book, American Theocracy:
[A]n elected leader who believes himself in some way to speak for God, a
ruling political party that represents religious true believers and seeks to
mobilize the churches, the conviction of many voters in that Republican
party that government should be guided by religion, and on top of it all,
White House implementation of domestic and international political
agendas that seem to be driven by religious motivations and biblical
worldviews. 101
The separation of church and state in a formal sense does not prevent
religious doctrine and religious individuals from inspiring state policy and
conditioning political debate. However, it does prevent religious organizations
and groups from exercising formal or de facto control over the state. It is the
difference between inspiration and control that one must note when
contemplating the political influence of religious or economic actors.
In sum, separationism is a messy enterprise, a question of degree. Chief
Justice Burger has confessed that "total separation is not possible in an absolute
sense," that "[s]ome relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable" and that "the line of separation, far from being a
'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship."' 1 2 Given the importance of religion
and economy in American society, it could hardly be otherwise. But the fact of
a formal separation provides constitutional criteria for principled arguments
and establishes a baseline of secularism in governance. Formal separation
limits the amount of control religious authorities can exercise. The absence of a
formal separation with regard to monetary influence is damning in this precise
regard.

99.

100.

Id. at 16.

101.

JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 5
PHILLIPS, supra note 96, at viii-ix.

102.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).

(1927).
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2. Lessons for the Separationof Business and State
Much like the case of religious authority infiltrating the state, allowing a
fusion between money and politics threatens core principles relating to the
nature of the state and individual rights. First, when religious or monetary
power is allowed to translate into political power, sovereignty is redefined.
When sovereignty comes from a superior being or wealthy interests, the notion
of popular sovereignty becomes pure myth. Second, when policies and
candidacies become significantly influenced by money or religion, the
frequency and value of reasoned debate on the merits of candidates or policy
alternatives decrease. Third, when power stems from corporations or religious
groups instead of ordinary people, political equality declines. Inequality in
access and the distributive effects of policy outcomes reveals that all citizens
are far from equal in their political rights. As explained by Justice O'Connor,
"the essential command of the Establishment Clause [is] .. .that government
must not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the
political community.' 10 3 Similarly, the absence of a separation of business and
state makes a person's wealth and corporate affiliation relevant to his standing
in the political community.
The first dilemma concerns whether our representative democracy will
become a theocracy or a plutocracy. The second and third dilemmas pertain to
free exercise of religious or political freedoms. Theocracy endangers the free
exercise of religion and the rights of religious minorities, while plutocracy
threatens the free exercise of politics and the rights of the middle and lower
socio-economic classes. Thus, each separation problem relates both to the
nature of the state and the rights of citizens.
Beginning with the nature of the state, both theocracy and plutocracy arise
from the entanglement of powerful social institutions with the sphere of
governance. The excessive entanglement problems of both church and business
arise from the fact that institutions, participants, and values belonging to the
civic, public sphere of the state are unduly influenced by another sphere. Our
political tradition relies on this notion of separate spheres of influence: church
and state as two institutions that properly occupy separate spheres, business and
state as two institutions that properly occupy separate spheres, each for the
benefit of the other. As the Supreme Court beautifully illustrates, this is the
core logic of separationism in American political theory:
The [First] Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official
establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal
relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies.
Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was
broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to
103. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
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create a complete and permanent
separation of the spheres of religious
4
activity and civil authority. 10
Religious authority encroaching on civil authority leads to theocracy and
oppression of minority religions. Corporate political activity, when
insufficiently regulated, inserts economic authority over civil authority and
leads to plutocracy and oppression of lower socio-economic classes.
Excessive entanglement renders the state merely the secular arm of the
church or the market maintaining outward order and decorum among men,
subordinating it to a greater power. This would be acceptable if either the
market or the church were capable of governing human affairs to the
satisfaction of our political values and traditions. But the market is not a
suitable institution of governance. It is in fact the government that keeps the
market free, sustainable, and relatively just by policing anticompetitive
behavior, illegalizing corrupt practices, instituting consumer protections,
regulating pollution, overseeing product safety, maintaining minimum
standards for wages and working conditions, to name just a few examples.
Still, traditional state functions, such as social security, even policing,
jailing, and the training and provision of soldiers, increasingly appear destined
for the private sector. Using these examples or others that another political
system might consider within the domain of the state, such as the media or
health care, the conclusion remains the same: the state is increasingly
irrelevant. In this way, each area of human life, from health to security,
becomes an industry, a new front on which corporations can turn a profit. The
proper realm of state functions, evaluating the performance of the private sector
in any given front, and the proper rules on issues such as competition, taxation,
and labor standards are all, of course, political choices. But exercising any of
these choices is recast as interference with the market, a sort of heresy. This
belief in markets has become a passion analogous to religious fervor, causing
human beings to insist on some authority higher than political choice, an
authority higher than government.
Moving away from the nature of the state and to the question of individual
rights, the dilemma can be stated as this: do we desire that the free exercise of
religion be an entitlement of all Americans? Do we desire that the free exercise
of politics be an entitlement as well? The object of a separation of business and
state in this regard is to secure the free exercise of politics, which obtains when
popular sovereignty and political equality are respected. This form of free
exercise is secure when monetary influence does not translate into political
influence. 10 5 American political thought is rooted in the belief that the state
104. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947).
105. Others would say that the regulation of monetary influence frustrates the free exercise
of politics. This raises an interesting conflict of rights. The analysis begins with whether one
believes money to be a legitimate form of political expression. My concern with this type of
political expression is that it is in practice only available to relatively wealthy interests and
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should not be subordinated to any church, and that individuals are entitled to
choose and freely exercise their own religion. The strength of this belief should
not be any stronger than the belief that the state should not be subordinated to
or formally coordinated with corporations, and that the people should have the
right to meaningful and relatively equal political participation.
Religious and economic values cannot help but influence politics and it
would be inconsistent with democracy for individuals to be disallowed from
seeking to vindicate their religious or economic interests through the political
process. The question addressed in this Essay is not how to prevent
corporations and the wealthy from vindicating their interests through politics,
but rather how to conceive of and limit the influence of monetary power over
politics. In other words, market actors should be able to express their political
views, but their superior resources should not be allowed to drastically affect
political outcomes. This leads to plutocracy and threatens free exercise. Again,
whether we speak of the boundaries between religion and state or business and
state, the question is one of degree.
Therefore, we might be inspired by the three-pronged test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman designed by the Supreme Court to "draw lines with reference to the
three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford
protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity." '' 10 6 Admittedly, applying this test to ascertain
impermissible interference with the state flips the matter on its head. The
Supreme Court was concerned about state encroachment on the religious
sphere-whether the state had made a law "respecting an establishment of
religion."' 10 7 The Court was not addressing a foreign sphere's encroachment on
the state. But the parallels are nevertheless striking: the separation of business
and state seeks to limit sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
of moneyed interests in state activity. The Court synthesized three tests from
prior cases: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' 10 8 Some relationship between the state and
economic inequality in the United States is extremely high. This means that this right quickly runs
up against the rights of others to a fair and equal system of political participation. It may boil
down to a question of degree, but in principle it is difficult to accept that the use of monetary
power to control a deliberative, participatory system of representative democracy constitutes a
legitimate exercise of political freedom.
106. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
107.

Id.

108. Id. Although these formulations hardly appear to lend themselves to judicial
interpretation, several Justices have said the same about the Lemon test itself. See, e.g., Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-637 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[D]iscerning the subjective
motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.... To
look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not
exist.") (emphasis in original). Moreover, the purpose here is not to formulate a judicial test, but
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religion is inevitable, but excessive entanglement is forbidden. For our
purposes, excessive entanglement must refer not to the economic or distributive
function of a piece of legislation, a judicial precedent, or executive action, but
rather the role of economic influence in generating law and policy. For
example, concerns over sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
would counsel us to scrutinize the gifts and travel purchased09 for politicians by
lobbyists, the use of earmarks, and campaign contributions. 1
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence also draws our attention
to the problem of secrecy common to separation problems. The Court has
indicated that the Establishment Clause prohibits religious groups and
organizations from participating in state affairs: "Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa." 110 Let us take note of the word
"secretly" above. Corporate donations, lobbyist contacts, and the true interests
motivating public policies, from attempts to privatize social security to the
invasion of Iraq, are rarely made visible to the average voter. This signals the
need for transparency and disclosure regarding political contributions and
contacts with lobbyists. But on a grander scale, the various facets of the
separation of church and state remind us of the need for a formal separation in
which such tests can be solidly grounded.
III
THE SEPARATION OF BUSINESS AND STATE

Section 1. Democratic integrity being vital to the principles and operation
of our system of government, and the political rights of natural persons, the
Separation of Business and State is hereby established. Popular sovereignty and
political equality shall not be denied or abridged by allowing monetary power
to translate into political power. To this end, presidential and congressional
elections shall be publicly financed.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This amendment shall not be so construed as to limit the power
of the United States to regulate economic actors or economic affairs within its
jurisdiction.
-Proposed Amendment XXVIII to the Constitution of the United States
(2007)"'.

rather to locate lines of inquiry relevant to the third separation, to advance our thinking.
109. I mean to be cautious in suggesting that doctrinal tools meant to guide courts can play
the role of political philosophy in guiding citizens in their efforts to determine the proper
relationship between the spheres of business and state. This is why I suggest that we might be
inspired by them, but not that we ought to literally apply them.
110. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
111. I propose this Amendment as a thought experiment.
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Existing law on campaign finance and corruption provides an important
degree of separation between business and state. 112 Without them, our country
would be abjectly corrupt. But the existing laws do not have constitutional
status, nor do they offer a formal separation between business and state. Indeed,
the task of regulating the role of money in politics is extraordinarily difficult
and possibly doomed because the only formal, sacrosanct norm in play has
been interpreted in favor of business interests. Just this past June, for example,
in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,"' the
Supreme Court further eviscerated the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA), commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Act. 114 Corporations
were entitled to First Amendment free speech protection in their quest to
control political outcomes, but no rule of similar weight could be found 115
to
protect the governmental interest in regulating corporate political influence.
Even acknowledging that constitutional norms can be interpreted to
questionable effect to suit the dominant interests of the day,' 16 the fact of a
constitutional norm provides a hook for principled argument and, most
117
importantly, a great deal of weight in favor of the protected interest.
112. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000) (bribery and embezzlement); Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 181 (to be codified in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.) (campaign contributions); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)
(upholding the BCRA's prohibition on express advocacy, or its functional equivalent, by a
corporation in the period immediately preceding an election). The BCRA is distinguished from the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), and the like in that it
pertains to the political process and federally-funded agencies, whereas the activities of the
Securities and Exchange Commission pertain to corporate activity within the economic sphere.
Although somewhat cosmetic and weak, not to mention lacking in independent oversight, the
Democrats' pending ethics reform bill also merits attention. See Jeff Zeleny & Carl Hulse, U.S.
Congress Votes to Tighten Rules on Lobbyist Ties, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 2007, at Al.
113.
127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007) (striking down on First Amendment grounds the BCRA's
prohibition on issue advocacy advertisements by corporations and unions).
114. 116 Stat. 181.
115. The operative functions of the opinion in these regards are: holding that the BCRA
section restricting corporate advertisements is in fact a restriction on political speech and therefore
subject to strict scrutiny, see Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2663-64, and deciding that no
compelling interest is furthered by regulating the ads in question, see id. at 2671-74. Two
established governmental interests were held inapplicable: "preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption" and "addressing 'the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."' Id. at 2672.
116. Consider, for example, the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause, passed in order to protect the rights of freed slaves, to prevent states from
regulating corporations as they please. Years after holding that corporations possessed legal
personhood, the Supreme Court denied full personhood to human beings who were "1/8th Negro"
or more. See THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE
AND THE THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 95-127 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation

of the Fourteenth Amendment).
117.
Why democratic integrity was not enshrined within the Bill of Rights is a question
beyond the scope of this Essay. But it is a question worth pondering. For example, before the
passage of the First Amendment, Great Britain's troubles with the East India Company were on
display. It was in fact a battle for Britain to restrain the political activities of the Company and to
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A focus on earlier separations helps us arrive at a deeper understanding of
the challenges we now face in relation to money in politics, one that can shape
the public debate and lead to stronger laws. By recognizing that our current
challenge is mostly unique in superficial detail, we may clear the haze. As
Madison stated, factions are united by interest or passion, two problems of
human nature. Interest is exemplified by greed and power-seeking, qualities
that motivate the separation of powers. We should understand passion to mean
something closer to "the condition of being acted upon," rather than "extreme,
compelling emotion." 118 This ability of organized groups to act upon member's
sensibilities and thus replace the secular, civic ethic with a religious agenda is
one reason behind the separation of church and state. The problem of money in
politics presents challenges of both interest and passion-interest because
corporations are designed to maximize profit for shareholders, a goal that
causes them to set their sights on controlling the government, and passion
because politics has been affected by the norms and values of capitalism, such
that profit-seeking has supplanted the civic functions of reasoned debate and
citizen empowerment.119
The contours of the separation of business and state should therefore
account for both interest and passion. I argue that interest causes excessive
physical entanglement-tangible meddling in politics through campaign
contributions, lobbyists, and corporate ownership of the media. This
entanglement affects the integrity of political institutions and their
accountability to ordinary people. Passion, on the other hand, causes excessive
ideological entanglement-politics adopting a profit-maximization ethos, being
run like a business, and the supplanting of the civic ethic with a business ethic.
Interest concerns the rules of the game, while passion concerns the spirit in
which the game is played. The first is a matter of law; the second is a matter of
ethos and public values. The relationship between the two is mutually
reinforcing, such that progress on one front ought to produce progress on the
other.
A. Physical Entanglement
Physical entanglement consists of all the tangible ways in which undue
influence is exerted upon the state. Specifically, physical entanglement includes
all the ways corporations might invest in a politician or, more broadly, the ways
in which monetary power can translate into political power. Such entanglement
assert sovereignty over territories controlled by the company. See The India Act of 1784, 24 Geo.
3, c. 25, § 2 (Eng.) and The Charter Act of 1813, 53 Geo. 3, c. 155 (Eng.). Against this backdrop,
it might be considered evident that corporations could significantly disrupt the democratic norms
upon which our democracy was premised.
118.
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1310 (2d ed.
1975).
119. PHILLIPS, supra note 96, at 335 (discussing "free-market core theology" and "tax cut
theology").
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includes campaign contributions and events at which lobbyists influence
politicians' priorities. 120 In a system where Congressional candidates must raise
$1 to $7 million and presidential candidates must raise hundreds of millions of
dollars, candidates must plan and formulate public policy from the perspective
of their core donors, rather than the general public. Needless to say, they run on
a platform calculated to obtain popular support, but they must satisfy their
financial backers to the point of obtaining the funds required to run for office
and later secure re-election. 12 1 In terms of elections, ordinary people cannot
gauge what they are voting for; and, their range of choice in candidates is
severely limited, as only those candidates amenable to the agenda of moneyed
interests will stand a chance. In terms of public policy formation, the prospects
for independent leadership, careful consideration of options on their merits for
the common good, and accountability to the general public are cast into doubt.
Under the current realities of campaign finance, the need to raise large
sums of money compromises the integrity of political choices. To borrow a
metaphor from Thomas Paine, "as a man, who is attached to a prostitute, is
unfitted to choose or judge of a wife, ' 122 so is a man beholden to corporate
interests unfitted to choose sound public policy. Such a man will undoubtedly
enact private policy into public policy. Analogous to the case of the King of
England at the time of the American Revolution, the will of corporations and
other moneyed interests is the law, but instead of proceeding directly from their
mouths, it is handed to the people under the formidable shape of an act of
Congress, a judicial decision, or presidential action. 123 If we desire that policy
decisions be debated openly on the merits and decided with due regard for the
public interest, then we implicitly disagree with the view that the amount of
money offered to influence a given policy choice is a clear social signal that
should guide the decision.
Similar to the dynamic motivating a separation of persons, which notes
that a separation of powers means little if the same people hold posts within
various branches, the separation of powers will also mean very little if
members of the executive and the legislature are bankrolled by the same
moneyed interests. Full public financing of elections should therefore be seen
as the preferred means of ending excessive physical entanglement. 124
120.
121.

See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
This sort of politics is common in democracies world-wide. See U.S. AGENCY FOR

INT'L DEV.,

EMERGING

MONEY IN

POLITICS HANDBOOK:

DEMOCRACIES

A

GUIDE

27-32

TO INCREASING

(2003),

TRANSPARENCY

available

IN

at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/usaidmoneypolitics.pdf
(last visited January 10, 2008).
122.

See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 12 (2002).

123. This paraphrases id. at 8.
124. The political obstacles for meaningful reform are presently being tested by Senators
Charles E. and Arlen Specter. They are seeking sponsors for a constitutional amendment that
would overturn Supreme Court caselaw, beginning with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
holding that money is a form of protected speech. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Senators Push for
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B. IdeologicalEntanglement
"The ethics of25business are not those of society, but rather those of the
poker game." 1
-A.Z.

Carr

"POLITICS, n. A strife of interests masquerading as a contest of
principles."
126
-Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary
While physical entanglement suggests the need for stricter regulations, the
dimension of ideological entanglement raises questions regarding political
ethos, specifically the values that guide modes of debate and persuasion.
Ideological entanglement refers to politicians' and political institutions'
adoption of an ethos associated with profit-maximization and market actors. 127
Profit in politics need not be measured in dollars, for political capital is much
broader than economic capital. Public perception, for example, is a valuable
commodity to any politician, perhaps more valuable than money itself. It is
therefore not surprising that politics is becoming a perception management
game, instead of a process for enabling rational debate on the issues. As Ronald
Dworkin has noted, 128 politics now seems directed at winning at any cost,
instead of enabling rational debate on the merits of policies. This relates to
rhetoric itself, a vehicle for persuasion and manipulation distinct from markets.
The use of rhetoric to manipulate public perception, however, is a strategy that
elevates profit over principles. This ordering lies at the core of single-minded
profit maximization and returns us to the question of whether an ethos innate to
one sphere ought to be accepted in a different sphere.
This confusion between the spheres of business and state erodes the
public's ability to be informed on and participate in issues of public
importance. For example, rather than inform the public on why the U.S.
invaded Iraq, whether those reasons bore any fruit in practice, and the current
grounds for a continued military presence in Iraq, our political leadership labels
detractors as terrorist supporters, coins many sound bite phrases-such as
Oct.
8,2007,
at
Amendment,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Fund-Raising
(last
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/senators-push-for-fund-raising-amendment/
Excellent proposals for limiting physical entanglement are on the
visited January 10, 2008).
table. Advocacy groups have also put forward meaningful proposals. Consider, for example, the
election reform recommendations made by Common Cause. See Common Cause Homepage,
(last visited July 8,
http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNKIMQIwG&b=186966
2007).
125. Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?,46 HARV. Bus. REV. 143 (1968).
126. The Devil's Dictionary, http://www.thedevilsdictionary.com/?P (last visited January
10, 2008).
127. I refer to this meaning of the term, ideology: "the doctrines, opinions, or way of
thinking of an individual, class, etc." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH
UNABRIDGED 902 (2d ed. 1975).

128.

See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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"defeatocrats" and "cut and run" democrats -29-andquite strategically and
self-consciously fashions an entire set of new post-hoc rationales for the war.
Thus, an invasion originally about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
becomes a quest to spread freedom and democracy, bring rights to Muslim
women, provide stability in the Middle East, and is reconfigured as a necessary
step in winning the war on terror. 130 It matters little that AI-Qaeda did not exist
in Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion. It also matters little that the invasion has
become a cause c6l bre for terrorists everywhere. As reported by the New York
Times, "Bush did such a good job selling the weapons-hunting nostrum that 40
percent of Americans recently said the weapons were there."' 3' In fact, at the
moment of the 2004 presidential election, 50 percent of Americans believed
32
that Iraqis formed part of the group of hijackers behind the 9/11 attacks. 1
President Bush used the media to sell the war just as corporations use the
media to sell products and make a profit. Both will use advertisements, slogans,
and celebrity spokespeople to convince consumers that they should buy the
product. The goal of politics has become much like this. Politics seeks to
convince us, not to enable us. Political discourse is designed to win re-election
and to gain power for political shareholders. As Paul Hawken puts it, "We have
elevated the ideology and mores of corporate life into a belief system before
which we pay homage, and we have allowed it to take over the political
system."' 133 Rather than honestly address any given event, the machinery of
politics is harnessed to control political fallout by managing public perceptions.
This modus operandi need not favor business interests over the people's
interests, but in practice it does so. Business interests enjoy superior financial
resources and ownership of the media. 134 This leads to a superior ability to

129. See Bush Goes on Offensive Against 'Cut and Run' Democrats, FoxNEws.coM, Sept.
29, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,216417,00.html (last visited January 10, 2008)
(referring to a statement made by President Bush: "The party of FDR, the party of Harry Truman
has become the party of cut and run."); Patrick Yoest & George Cahlink, Lawmakers Split on
Response to Airline Terror Threat, CQ TODAY, Aug. 10, 2006, available at
http://public.cq.com/public/20060810_Cqtoday__yoest.html
(last visited January 10, 2008)
(discussing a statement made by then-House Majority Whip John. A. Boehner when he referred to
democrats as "defeatocrats").
130. See President George W. Bush, Press Conference at the White House (July 12, 2007),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070712-5.html
(last visited
January 10, 2008) (discussing the changed policy of instilling democracy in Iraq, helping Iraqi
leaders secure their positions, and making sure terrorists know they cannot hide out in Iraq).
131. Bulletin: No W.M.D. Found, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,2005, at A34.
132. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 128. Certainly some of these mistaken beliefs could be
due to cognitive error among voters; however, certainly a great deal of these beliefs must be
attributed to the Bush administration's consistent efforts to link the war in Iraq to 9/11 and
WMDs.
133. PAUL HAWKEN, THE ECOLOGY OF COMMERCE: A DECLARATION OF SUSTAINABILITY
123 (1993).
134.
See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY (2004); ROBERT W.
MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION

(1999).
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harness the power of public relations, marketing, and psychological tactics,
both in the sale of their own positions and in the discrediting of others.
We all recognize that the goal of business is to maximize economic
capital. We should not, however, permit the goal of politics to be the
maximization of political capital-power and simply winning. 135 In practice,
winning means ensuring one's election or re-election, simply minimizing
public fallout from mistakes, discrediting an adversary, whether or not they
deserve to be discredited on the merits, and obscuring or challenging
inconvenient facts simply because they are inconvenient. Thus, concern with
the accuracy of data suggesting the presence of WMDs in Iraq makes one "antiBush" or "anti-American." Concern with House members taking illegal funds
from lobbyists makes one "Anti-Tom DeLay." Indeed, the response from
Delay's office to the PAC scandal was to attack the credibility of the New York
Times, instead of addressing the issue: "There are certain liberal newspapers,
including the New York Times and the Washington Post, that are out to get
136
Tom DeLay."
This leads to inefficiencies and distortions in both the market for ideas and
the ability of the public to take actions that are responsive to their own
preferences. Also implicit in this dilemma is the suspicion that politicians
decide upon a course of action in advance and then figure out how to minimize
public outrage and maximize public acceptance. In few instances do politicians
treat the public with respect and entertain an honest debate in which they are
open to persuasion. 137
The profit-maximization ethic in politics, a facet of ideological
entanglement, frustrates the free exercise of politics. For example, Jefferson's
prescription for obtaining knowledge now seems an impossible burden: "A
patient pursuit of facts, and cautious combination and comparison of them, is
the drudgery to which man is subjected by his Maker, if he wishes to obtain
sure knowledge."' 138 Similarly, Thomas Paine's conviction that nature and
reason might triumph over show, prejudice, and interest becomes increasingly

135. Consider that automakers maintain that global warming is a problem. See Danny
Hakim, Challenge to Emissions Rule is Set to Start, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, at A19.
Compare this to the Bush administration's constant assertions that we are winning in Iraq, that
there was a connection between Saddam and WMDs and Al Qaeda; and that we are "spreading
freedom."
136. Carl Hulse & Philip Shenon, DeLay Denounces Report on Payments to His Family,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at A21 (Mr. Delay is quoted as calling the article about his wife and
daughter's receipt of more than 500,000 by his political action and campaign committees, "just
another seedy attempt by the liberal media to embarrass me").
137. See DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 128 ("Truth as a gold standard has become obsolete:
politicians never seek accuracy in describing their own records or their opponents' positions.
They seek the maximal distortion that leaves some tiny fig leaf of truth intact somewhere in the
fine print.").
138.

1998)

THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 71 (Frank Shuffelton ed.,
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outdated. Thus wrote Paine: "And however our eyes may be dazzled with
show, or our ears deceived by sound; however prejudice may warp our wills or
interest darken our understanding, the simple voice of nature and reason will
say it is right."' 39 Never before did the forces of prejudice and interest have
such sophisticated modes of influence at their disposal. Similarly, Freud's
description of leaders capable of securing peace now seems even more utopian
than before: "independent thinkers, unamenable to intimidation and fervent in
the quest of truth . . . [who have] subordinated [their] instinctive life to the
dictates of reason."' 140 Can common sense prevail amidst ideological
entanglement, the very antithesis of enlightenment ideals?
Here, separationism means distancing business values from civic values,
creating a place where common sense can be found and good leaders
cultivated. This would be a minimum condition for the free exercise of politics.
But on present course, ideological entanglement is demolishing the public
sphere, the place where concerned parties voice their concerns and learn from
each other, and ultimately arrive at outcomes that can be justified on the
strength, not wealth, of the competing positions expressed. 141 This destruction
bears familiar fruit: malaise, cynicism, and popular disenchantment-all
predictable qualities of a society that no longer believes in itself. 142
IV
THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY
The separation of business and state stands as the unfinished legacy of the
Constitution. We separated the powers of government because we recognized
our flaws as human beings, and we separated church from state because we
wanted to safeguard the integrity of each. Fundamentally, both of these
separations embody the same insight: democracy itself requires autonomy from
the perennial forces that would corrupt it. Because these forces take root in the
human heart, separationism is a form of political discipline, a way of binding
139.
PAINE, supra note 122, at 6.
140. Sigmund Freud, Why War?-A Letter to Albert Einstein, in THE FUTURE OF PEACE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6 (Nicholas N. Kittrie et al. eds. 2003).

141. Although one might be tempted to describe the ways in which free market ideology
has become a quasi-religion of most politicians, and to link this belief system to a decrease in the
breadth of political choice, I believe it would be a mistake. A widespread belief in certain
economic doctrines does not threaten democracy per se. Misleading and disregarding the public,
on the other hand, preventing it from passing judgment on this widespread belief and the policies
generated thereby (or any other belief or policy) does threaten democracy.
142.

See JEDEDIAH PURDY, FOR COMMON THINGS: IRONY, TRUST, AND COMMITMENT

IN

AMERICA TODAY 10-12(1999) (noting the "contemporary attitude of wry detachment that avoids
taking anything or anyone all that seriously [which] easily devolves into a meretricious sarcasm;"
and identifying "sanctimonious political pronouncements" as one of the cultural elements that
"render clich& nearly anything that anyone would feel it important to say."). "In place of the
romantic idea that each of us harbors a true self struggling for expression," Purdy's ironist "offers
the suspicion that we are just quantum selves-all spin, all the way down." Id. at 10. Spin is
nothing less than the language of ideological entanglement.
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ourselves to the mast of good governance. This is our American political
tradition.
The viability of continuing this tradition depends on our hopes for
democracy. I have discussed the goals of ensuring accountability, allowing for
meaningful and relatively equal participation, and have insisted on an open and
sincere debate. A deeper and less familiar goal also deserves mention.
Separations are, in practice, questions of degree, and they are from time to time
eroded; 143 even so, the fact of a constitutional separation significantly
conditions the debate. It lends legitimacy to those who seek integrity in
government and space for democracy. And insofar as legal frameworks
influence the socialization of citizens, separationism improves our values, even
our character. 144
The deeper goal to which I refer relates to socialization. Underlying each
separation we have seen certain human shortcomings attributed to human
nature. The need to constrain them constitutes the grand theme that unites the
various parts of this Essay. The need for the separation of powers comes from
certain aspects of human nature, tyrannical and lusting for power. This is the
problem of unenlightened self-interest. The need for the separation of church
and state derives from other aspects of human nature; humans can be divisive,
exclusive, egotistical, and prone to marginalizing and subjugating others who
are different. This is the problem of passion and ideology. Excessive
entanglement between business and state is a new manifestation of the same
problem, coupled with the sophisticated vehicle of the corporation. But beyond
mere constraint, we ought to entertain a seldom-heard possibility inherent in
separationism: enabling democratic
politics to serve a transformative function,
45
namely improving human nature. 1
143.

With regard to the separation of powers, for example, see generally ARTHUR M.
(describing presidential offenses against the
separation of powers); ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973)

PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER WATERGATE (2005) (describing a resurgence in congressional power

after Watergate and a new rise in presidential usurpation of powers, most notably in the post-9/ 11
era). On the topic of the erosion of the separation of church and state, see GERARD V. BRADEY,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS

IN AMERICA

(1987)

(offering an excellent

sense of how

separationism is a messy enterprise and tracing this particular separation from the foundational
period to the recent past), and Susan Gellman, The First Amendment in a Time that Tries Men 's
Souls, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 97-100 (2002).

144. E.B. Taylor's classic 1871 definition posits that law is part of culture: culture, "that
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and many other
capabilities and habits acquired by ... [members] of society." Marshall Soules, Notes Toward a
Definition of Culture, 2002, www.mala.bc.ca/-soules/media 112/culture.htm (last visited January
10, 2008).
145. In making my concluding comments on the matter of transformation, I do not attempt
to account for the many important arguments already made in this regard. See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS,
A
DISSERTATION
ON
THE
CANON
AND
FEUDAL
LAW
(1765)
at
htp://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=43 (last visited January 10,
2008) (noting the detriment to liberty and human potential arising from ecclesiastical authority and
civil tyranny-"Thus was human nature chained fast for ages in a cruel, shameful, and deplorable
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We must ask, if not a church meddling in politics, if not a tyrannical
dictator trying to amass all the powers of governance, if not governmental
capture by wealthy actors, then what will be the next manifestation of our failed
human natures? Personal and collective transformation are of the essence lest
democratic politics remain in the same, age-old cycle of bad-faith, pretext, and
exploitation. Surely if greed, the lust for power, and the need for superiority
persist within the human heart, then no system, no safeguard, no ethic will truly
suffice. I do not mean to set out a utopian project that would free future
generations from the responsibility of democratic vigilance that attends selfgovernance. I merely mean to point out that in addition to vigilance and
separations, which are preclusive ethical projects aiming to suppress negative
aspects of our nature, we ought to consider the positive ethical project
associated with self-governance. Ultimately, government must serve a set of
interests and to posit the desirability of popular sovereignty and political
equality is to profess great faith in the people, in the collectivity, in ourselves.
The need for transformation is a concession to the corruptibility of any
system, even, or especially, one premised on popular sovereignty and political
equality. The phenomenon of "illiberal democracy," Fareed Zakaria's term for
democracies that become repressive, illustrates this. Zakaria notes that
"[d]emocratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or
reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits ' on
146
their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms."
Business is not the only force that can co-opt government. It is easy to identify
because it is a force that is outside of and distinct from most people. But the
very idea behind business and capitalism derives from the need to harness the
self-interest that manifests within us. That is, capitalism is thought to be a
humane alternative to a system in which self-interest is not usefully channeled
and may resort to more violent forms than economic competition. 147 If politics
no longer serves the cause of economic interests, might it revert back to serving
the more vindictive forces of nationalism or ethnic oppression?' 4 8 The tradition

servitude"); Ralph Waldo Emerson, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR: SELF-RELIANCE, COMPENSATION

77 (1911) (discussing the need to focus on personal transformation, beyond social
transformation-"All men plume themselves on the improvement of society, and no man
improves"); STANLEY CAVELL, CONDITIONS HANDSOME AND UNHANDSOME: THE CONSTITUTION
OF EMERSONIAN

PERFECTIONISM

(1991)

(discussing moral

perfectionism in the context of

democracy). I have chosen to account for a few authors in the text, but mainly to make my own
argument lightly and briefly. The conclusion, like the rest of this Essay, is intended to generate
questions and provoke thought. It is not intended to reach any definitive conclusions or provide a
full scholarly review of related sources.
146. Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of illiberalDemocracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1997).
Milton Friedman has praised capitalism in this regard: "an arrangement under which
147.
greed will do the least harm; capitalism is that kind of system." EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL
TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SPECULATION 241 (1999).

148. Zakaria cites many examples of this scenario where the people elect violent leaders, as
in the case of Hamas, or decide to oppress minorities openly. See Zakaria, supra note 146, at 22.
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of separationism is therefore just the first answer to corruption. Transformation
is the second and more enduring one.
John Dewey has provided a foundation upon which the transformative
argument can be linked to democracy. He suggested that politics could be a
process of personal and community growth. Noting the benefits of negotiation
and participation in shared communities of interest, he expressed faith in the
capacity of the public to participate meaningfully in politics and to be improved

thereby. 149
The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial
explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be
successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are
educated.... But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than
a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of
conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number
of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his
own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give
point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those
barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from
perceiving the full import of their activity. These ... points of contact...
secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as the
incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group which in its
150
exclusiveness shuts out many interests.
Dewey's democratic humanism is part of the ethic with which to replace
the business ethic in governance.
Because this ethic is presently far from established, we must once again
take legal and institutional steps to account for human nature and corporate
nature. While these forces remain, separation is necessary. But this does not
mean that we should rest once separation has been accomplished. We should
then use this opportunity to ask what is at the heart of our human weakness, this
taken-for-granted reality that human nature is negative. The two earlier
separations account for the forces of self-interest, ideological passions, and
factions but do not set out to improve them. The separation of business and
state would carry on this necessary condition of accounting for self-interest and
passion by keeping them a distance away from the state. But in the end, we are
left in a reactive mode, constantly dealing with the symptoms of a problem
instead of dealing with its causes. And, worse, it involves confusing an
opportunity for a problem.
Robert Bush and Joseph Folger's book, The Promise of Mediation, sheds
further light on the opportunity at hand. They maintain that mediation-a
149.

Compare DEWEY, supra note 100, with WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC

(1925). See also

STEVEN C. ROCKEFELLER, JOHN DEWEY: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND DEMOCRATIC

HUMANISM (1991).
150.
JOHN DEWEY, 9 THE MIDDLE WORKS: 1899-1924, at 93 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1980).

BUSINESS AND STATE

2007]

2389

procedure in which a disinterested third party facilitates the resolution of a
problem between two or more interested parties-can do more than relieve
backlog in the courts. 151 Instead they contend that mediation can generate the
empowerment of individuals to resolve conflict and increase their capacity to
empathize with others. Bush and Folger elaborate a transformational model of
mediation, where the job of the mediator is to empower the parties to take as
much control of the matter as possible and to encourage them to put themselves
in the shoes of the other parties involved. This model is an alternative to the
dominant directive model where the mediator attempts to steer the 52
parties
towards the resolution she thinks best, ignoring the potential for growth. 1
In the transformative orientation to conflict, two aspects of moral growth
are possible: first, the invigoration of self "through realizing and strengthening
one's inherent human capacity for dealing with difficulties of all kinds by
engaging in conscious and deliberate reflection, choice, and action;"' 153 second,
the ability to reach "beyond the self to relate to others" through "realizing and
strengthening one's inherent human capacity for experiencing and expressing
concern and consideration for others, especially others whose situation is
'different' from one's own."' 154 These aspects of growth are empowerment and
recognition.
Empowerment is the result of a state of affairs in which people frame
issues in their own terms, generating possible solutions and controlling
outcomes. The overlap with popular sovereignty and political equality should
be clear. Bush and Folger contend that mediation empowers individuals to take
control of their lives, and restores to the participants what is rightfully theirs:
the right to make decisions and to have some meaningful chance of those
decisions having traction. The practice of meaningful participation in the issues
that affect a person is thus said to inspire a "greater sense of self-respect, selfreliance, and self-confidence."1 55 The opportunities for recognition provided by
participatory processes such as mediation and democracy come in the form of
situations where it is advantageous to see the other parties' points of view and
come to understand their interests and experiences. This, along with
empowerment, is related to the overall goal of transformation-"the
transformation of individuals from fearful, defensive, and self-centered beings
into confident, empathetic, and considerate beings, and ... the transformation
of society from a shaky truce between enemies into a strong network of
151.
ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION, at xv
(1994) (noting the "opportunities that conflict affords for moral development" and asserting that
mediation can "capture those opportunities by helping people respond with compassionate
strength").
152. The fact that the corporate-controlled media and special interests currently accomplish
the same directive task in our democracy should not be lost on readers.

153.
154.

BusH & FoLGER,supra note 15 1, at 81.
Id.

155.

Id. at 20.
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156

allies."
Democracy is essentially a large-scale mediation where the interests of
millions of parties are mediated through representative institutions. Dewey,
Bush, and Folger point to the view that democracy is not just a mechanism for
producing good ends, but also a system of beneficial means. Through the
means of accommodating divergent viewpoints, understanding the situations of
others, and being called to form one's own opinions and to participate in
political dialogue, participants in democracy will find themselves presented
with opportunities for personal transformation. Collective transformation will
57
follow. 1
American democracy, with its tradition of separationism, is not laudable
ambition. 158
simply for its ability to restrain our vices, pitting ambition against
It deserves attention because of its habit of providing ways for us to overcome
our vices. Democracy places responsibilities upon individuals that, if exercised
in good faith, generate empathy and empowerment.
The transformative opportunities that self-governance supplies are of
course categorically undermined by excessive physical and ideological
entanglement between business and state. Corporate control of politics
disempowers citizens and business logic manifested in political discourse
ridicules the very concept of honesty, never mind recognition or empathy. The
modality of business is competition and the aim is victory. These are the
necessary consequences of corporate nature, as I have described it. This is the
level of narrow self-interest and ideological passion. We must transcend this
base level and aspire to something greater.
To the extent corporate influence is lessened, other forms of influence
must rush in to fill this void. It is in this regard that democratic governance,
freed from corporate entanglements, beckons ethical growth. Since the laws
and policies made in a democracy emanate from the people, the outer world
rapidly becomes a reflection of our collective inner world. Seen in this light,
personal transformation becomes patriotic. If our level of consciousness is
defined by anger, fear, passion, or greed, it follows that we will elect leaders
who will carry forth our ill-advised priorities. If we have transcended this level,
but our elected leaders have not, it follows that they will defy our will and

156. Id. at 20-21.
157. Dewey, Bush, and Folger may be describing the surface layer of something deeper.
What seems to lie beneath the transformations they describe is a change in consciousnesstranscendence of the impulse to subjugate (recall Hamilton's words, "ambitious, vindictive, and
rapacious"), a quieting of the mind, overcoming the ethical confusion that leads to a willingness to
manipulate others and, ultimately, the possibility of making something of the opportunities
inherent in democratic governance.
158. In addition to Madison's justification for the separation of powers along these lines,
we might also add Milton Friedman's belief that society's goal was simply to "set up an
arrangement under which greed will do the least harm: capitalism is that kind of system."
CHANCELLOR, supra note 147, at 335.
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pursue their own ill-advised priorities. And if the system itself is set up such
that only special interests have any traction, our level of consciousness-indeed
our very being-becomes irrelevant. This means that we must direct our efforts
at improving our own selves, our nation's public values, and our laws and
institutions. Each of these tasks is very much at home in our political history.
We are called to continue the American tradition of separationism.
Separationism provides a framework within which the issue of money in
politics can be conceptualized and addressed. This framework reminds us of
that we are part of a longstanding political project aimed at freedom and
governmental legitimacy. This is our lineage and, perhaps, our legacy.
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